http://www.perlmonks.org?node_id=789348


in reply to Re^2: mod_perl2 interactive startup
in thread mod_perl2 interactive startup

I believe the bar is a lot higher to extract data from a running program.

It is just as trivial. Cleartext Passwords in Linux Memory

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Re^4: mod_perl2 interactive startup
by amino (Initiate) on Aug 18, 2009 at 14:01 UTC
    It is just as trivial. Cleartext Passwords in Linux Memory

    "...that data from memory can be recovered with physical access to systems in a very short period of time." from the abstract of the paper that appears in the first few search results.

    That leads me to believe it is not as trivial b/c an intruder needs physical access.

      That leads me to believe it is not as trivial b/c an intruder needs physical access.

      It doesn't say that.

      Quickly overwriting passwords in memory would minimize the risk of capture via physical access, cold boot techniques, swap space forensics or simple, live, privileged memory captures.

        So are you arguing that random apache vulnerabilities are as likely to give simple, live, privileged memory access as they are to give access to the filesystem?? Assuming the system doesn't allow core dumps, this seems far-fetched.

        In its conclusion the paper doesn't argue that developers should store passwords in plaintext in configuration files (which is the insane point you seem to be arguing for). It argues that passwords should be erased from memory when they're no longer needed.

        Do you actually have anything useful to suggest?